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Abstract 
Today mobile devices are increasingly being used to provide health related information to healthcare related services 
on the Internet. However such devices have limited resources to enforce strong security measures and are easily 
vulnerable to attacks. In this paper we propose techniques for counteracting denial of service attacks on mobile 
devices that are providing the user’s health related information and for securing the communication between mobile 
nodes and healthcare service providers on the Internet. 
 
© 2013 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of [name organizer] 
 
Keywords: Mobile Healthcare; Security;  Denial of Service;  Traceback; IP Security. 
1. Introduction 
A denial of service (DoS) [1, 2] attack prevents access to resources by the legitimate users. Distributed 
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks is a case where several hundreds of zombies or botnets (compromised 
machines) are involved in the generation of attack traffic.  
DDoS is one of the major threats in the current Internet. There are many challenges when it comes to 
dealing the attacks on mobile nodes due to their limited resources. We envisage with growth in the 
wireless Internet and the mobile devices and their use in carrying out sensitive transactions is likely to 
make denial of service attacks even more a major concern in the near future. For example, there can be 
severe consequences if such attacks target a mobile device that is used for healthcare services. Hence 
there is need to develop techniques to detect and prevent denial of service attacks on the mobile devices. 
In this paper we propose techniques for counteracting denial of services on mobile devices that are 
being used in the provision of mobile healthcare services. Our model makes use of IPSec protocol [3] for 
traceback and prevention of attack traffic at the upstream nodes. The paper is organized as follows. 
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Section 2 presents some of the related work and Section 3 presents the attacker model. In Section 4, we 
propose techniques for securing the healthcare related communication and also to deal with denial of 
service attacks on the mobile nodes. In Section 5 we present a prototype implementation of our model and 
Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Related Work 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are more common in wired networks and there is 
ongoing research [1, 2] to deal with the attacks.  For example, filtering techniques such as [4-6] have been 
proposed to validate the source address of the IP packets. The main idea is that if traffic with spoofed 
source addresses can be minimized in the Internet, then this can also minimize DDoS attacks with 
spoofed source addresses. This will only leave DDoS attacks with correct source addresses to consider. 
Some authors have suggested traceback techniques [7-10] to identify the approximate spoofed source of 
attack. The main idea of the traceback techniques is that if the approximate spoofed source of attack can 
be identified, then attack traffic can be filtered at a point that is nearest to the attacking source.  This will 
result in saving the bandwidth at the victim’s end and for all upstream routers between the victim and the 
attacking sources. Some traceback techniques [7-10] can be performed only during the time of attack and 
some traceback techniques [10] are capable of performing post-mortem analysis. Statistical based filtering 
techniques [11] maintain the normal traffic behavior for each server or network. During the time of attack, 
the incoming packets are scored by comparing them with the stored traffic pattern. Packets that do not 
match with the stored patterns are considered to be malicious and dropped. Service specific access control 
techniques [12] have been proposed to permit only the traffic that is considered to be legitimate to access 
the services. However most of the techniques proposed to deal with the attacks in wired networks are not 
readily suitable to deal with the attacks in wireless networks. For example, we need to take different 
factors into consideration such as limited resources of the mobile nodes which make them easily 
vulnerable to such attacks and also lack of security techniques to deal with the attacks.  
There is some prior work related to DoS attacks in wireless networks.  Khan et al [13] considers 
different types of attacks that are possible in the WLAN, WiMax and WMAN technologies. The work 
specifically highlights the challenges to deal with the passive attacks and categorization of attacks at 
different layers of the protocol stack.  The analysis by He and Mitchell [14] identified DoS vulnerabilities 
in 802.11i and the work in [15, 16] presents detail discussion on how the attacks can be implemented in 
practice.  Liu and Yu [17] analyzed the authentication request flooding and association request flooding 
attacks and proposed to use MAC address filtering and traffic pattern filtering which enforces a limit on 
the maximum number of authentication or association requests from the mobile nodes. Furthermore, some 
techniques have been proposed to deal with the rouge access points in the wireless networks. Bahl et al 
[18] suggested dense deployment of sensors for monitoring the wireless networks for rouge access points. 
This technique makes use of the unused desktop resources in wired networks and USB based wireless 
adapters to minimize the deployment cost of the security sensors. The technique proposed by Sheng et al 
[19] detects the rouge access points by monitoring the changes in the round trip time when 
communicating with the local servers. Zeng et. al [20] proposed cookie based approach to deal with the 
denial of service attacks on the authentication mechanism during handover process. Xu et al [21] 
considered different types of jamming attacks and proposed dynamic changing of communication 
channels to deal with the attacks. Traynor et. al [22] used queue management techniques to deal with the 
saturation of the wireless links. Geng et al [23] proposed policy based schemes such as usage based 
charging, capped usage to deal with the DDoS attacks on the mobile nodes. However the proposed 
technique cannot defend against the ongoing attack on the mobile node and also techniques such as usage 
based charging may not be effective since the owner of the hosts are not aware about the compromise of 
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their nodes. Hence, currently there is a lack of comprehensive security techniques to deal with the DDoS 
attacks in wireless networks.   
3. Attacker Model 
As shown in Figure 1, consider a generic architecture where mobile customers can be accessing voice 
and data services from their mobile network service provider. In this paper, furthermore we envisage the 
mobile device to be used for receiving data from body sensor devices and sending it to Healthcare Service 
Providers (HSPs). In the current scenario, the information captured by different body sensors is forwarded 
to the user’s mobile device using wireless technologies such as Bluetooth, ZigBee, and WLAN. In some 
cases, the information from the body sensors is aggregated at the body sensor gateway before forwarding 
to the mobile device. The mobile device is used for secure communication of the body sensor information 
to different HSPs using mobile network or WLAN. 
 
One of the main advantages for using mobile device as the gateway is that the information from the 
body sensors can be accessed by the HSPs even when the user is mobile. However since the body sensor 
information has to be communicated securely to several HSPs, this could incur high overhead on the 
mobile device for storing the keys required for secure communication, establishing secure channels and 
transferring the body sensor information. In addition to this usage, the mobile devices are also used for 
accessing different applications such as accessing Internet, social networks and playing online games.  
Currently there is an increasing trend of attackers targeting attacks on mobile devices. Since mobile 
devices have limited resources, they are easily vulnerable to denial of service attacks. In case of 
successful attacks on the mobile devices, the HSPs will not have access to body sensor readings. Hence 
there is a need for techniques to minimize the overhead on the mobile device for secure communication of 
the body sensor information to different HSPs and a need for securing the mobile device from denial of 
service attacks. 
Figure 1: Current Scenario 
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Let us first consider the attacker model. The users can be accessing the service from their mobile 
network service provider or from foreign agent network service providers. Mobile IP [24] enables such 
seamless and uninterrupted access to the services to mobile users. Although, mobile devices are used for 
voice and data communication, the main aim of our work is to deal with DDoS attacks on the data 
services of the mobile nodes. We consider flooding attacks such as ICMP flood and UDP flood with 
correct or spoofed source address on the victim mobile devices. The attack traffic can be originating from 
the computing devices that are connected to wired networks or wireless networks. The owners of the 
devices from which the attack traffic is originating may not be aware of the compromise of their devices 
and being used for generation of attack traffic. As shown in Figure 1, there can be several attacking 
sources that are flooding the victim node with malicious traffic, resulting in the good traffic being 
dropped before it reaches the mobile node. Hence there is need to prevent the attack traffic at upstream 
nodes. 
4. Our Approach 
In this section, we propose techniques for securing mobile healthcare services. We aim to deal with 
denial of service attacks on mobile nodes and minimize the overhead on the mobile device that is used for 
healthcare services. We assume that the mobile devices have been allocated public IP addresses. This is 
reasonable following the migration to IPv6. Figure 2 shows the proposed model for securing the mobile 
healthcare services. We consider that all the users’ traffic that needs to be protected from denial of service 
attacks passes through a Security Enforcement Component (SEC). SEC can be implemented on existing 
routers or can be realized as add on module to existing routers. In our model, the attack can be prevented 
at the upstream nodes which co-operate with the SEC. The darkened nodes in Figure 3 represent the co-
operating nodes. The co-operating nodes can request similar service from SEC to protect their customers.   
The SEC enables secure communication of body sensor information to different HSPs with minimal 
overhead and also deals with the attacks on the mobile device. There are two logical components in SEC. 
The first component is a Trusted Health Service Gateway (THSG) which is trusted by the mobile users 
and the HSPs. In practice, THSG can be implemented by a trusted third party. The mobile user updates 
the THSG with the information of different HSPs that need to access a user’s body sensor information. 
The second logical entity is an Attack Prevention Gateway (APG) which deals with denial of service 
attacks on mobile devices. In practice, the APG can be implemented by a mobile network provider. In this 
paper, we consider both THSG and APG are being implemented on the same node.  
4.1. Operation 
The information from different body sensor devices is sent over a single secure link to the Trusted 
Health Service Gateway (THSG). THSG analyses the received information, and forwards the relevant 
user information to different HSPs. For example, HSP1 may be interested in ECG sensor readings and 
HSP2 may be interested in obtaining blood and pulse related sensor readings. THSG sends the 
information using secure communication channels such as IPSec tunnels or establish SSL connections to 
different HSPs. Since secure communication channels are established by the THSG, it minimizes the 
overhead on the mobile device and eliminates the need to store keys required for secure communication 
with different HSPs.  
Now let us consider how the APG component in SEC (referred to as SEC-APG) deals with the DoS 
attacks. Since all the traffic from the mobile device passes through the SEC, it develops a legitimate usage 
pattern for each mobile user. Default security settings are used for new mobile users. For example, 
security tools such as snort have several generic attack patterns to detect and prevent denial of service 
attacks. The SEC-APG monitors the traffic destined to the mobile device and prevents any attack traffic 
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from targeting the mobile device. If the attack traffic reaches a predefined threshold, the SEC-APG 
initiates techniques for prevention of attack traffic at the upstream co-operating nodes. 
The SEC-APG updates the co-operating nodes with the details of the victim that is experiencing the 
DDoS attacks. Now the co-operating nodes filter the traffic that is destined to the victim node and 
securely forward them to the SEC-APG using IPSec ESP tunneling. The SEC-APG retrieves the victim’s 
traffic from the tunnel, drops the traffic that is matching with the attack pattern and forwards only 
legitimate traffic to the victim. The SEC-APG keeps track of the attack traffic originating from each 
tunnel. If the attack traffic from any of the tunnel exceeds a threshold, then it sends a request to prevent 
the attack traffic at the upstream co-operating node before performing IPSec ESP tunneling of the traffic. 
After the tunnel is established between the SEC-APG and the co-operating node, there is no need to 
perform traceback for prevention of attack traffic at the upstream nodes. The starting point of the tunnel is 
used as the trusted traceback point for prevention of attack upstream. This is one of important advantages 
of our model. Furthermore, since IPSec is already a standard and likely to be supported in the near future 
on most of the existing devices, our model can be easily implemented in practice.  
As shown in Figure 3, M1G is the 
SEC for the (victim) mobile node; the 
darkened nodes are co-operating with 
the SEC-APG to prevent the attack 
upstream. Consider the scenario where 
the total traffic to the victim mobile 
node is originating from 1 to N 
channels and there are 1 to N-1 secure 
IPSec ESP channels and 1 insecure 
channel N. Hence the attack traffic can 
be prevented at the upstream 1 to N-1 
security channels. The attack traffic 
from the single insecure channel N is 
prevented at the SEC-APG. We do not 
perform traceback for the traffic from 
the insecure channel.       
When the attack traffic reaches a 
certain threshold, the SEC-APG sends 
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(ER1, M2G and FA1). Note that the 
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by THSG for forwarding body sensor 
information. Now all the traffic 
destined to the mobile node will be 
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between co-operating node and SEC-
APG). The traffic will be tunneled at 
the first deployed router. Since the 
tunnels terminate at the SEC-APG, 
there is no need for SEC-APG to 
perform traceback.  The starting point 
of the tunnel is considered as the node from which the attack traffic is originating. Hence the traceback 
can be performed to the first co-operating node that is nearest to the attacking source.  Also note that 
Figure 3: Our Approach 
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traceback and prevention of the attack at upstream nodes is possible even if there is no co-operation from 
the routers between the co-operating node and the SEC.  For example, in Figure 3 traceback can be 
performed between SEC and ER1even if there is no co-operation from IR1. 
4.2. SEC-APG Components 
Let us now consider how the SEC-APG can be used to detect and prevent attacks on mobile nodes. 
The SEC-APG components transparently monitor mobile nodes’ traffic for denial of service attacks. 
Device Identification and Store (DIS), Hybrid Attack Detection (HAD), and Dynamic Attack Prevention 
(DAP) are the important sub components of SEC-APG.   
The DIS is used for identification of the mobile devices. It analyses the traffic and maintains the logs 
of mobile nodes’ traffic. Since we consider IP based communication, the devices can be identified from 
the source or destination address of the traffic. In our model, the logs are used to determine the statistical 
security policies for each mobile node. Note that most of the mobile service providers charge the users 
based on the data downloads and/or uploads. Hence there is a need to log the mobile nodes’ traffic for the 
purpose of charging the customers. Our model makes use of these logs to determine the statistical 
behaviour of the mobile nodes’ traffic.  
The HAD is used for detection of known attacks and detection of suspicious behaviour by monitoring 
the mobile nodes traffic. It makes use of the signature based and anomaly based techniques for detecting 
the attacks on the mobile nodes. The evaluation process of the HAD works as follows: If the traffic is not 
matching with any of the attack signature and found to be legitimate by the anomaly based detection 
module, then the traffic is forwarded to the destination. If the traffic is matching with a known attack 
signature or found to be suspicious by the anomaly detection, then the traffic is dropped. We have created 
a database in the HAD of known attack signatures; the objective is that this database will be continually 
updated as and when new attack signatures are discovered. For example, we have used attack signatures 
in the detection engine from snort IDS for services such as Web server running on the mobile node, and 
for attacks such as distributed denial of service attacks on mobile nodes. If the traffic does not match with 
any of the attacks\ signatures then it is randomly validated against the statistical policies in the anomaly 
detection module. The anomaly detection module applies machine learning technique on the mobile node 
logs to differentiate between legitimate and suspicious behaviour for each mobile node. We are not 
describing this algorithm here in this paper due to space restrictions. Essentially this algorithm enables the 
anomaly detection module to capture the dynamic changes for each mobile node and identify the attacks. 
For example, from the logs we capture the statistical behaviour of a mobile node such as legitimate 
TCP/IP protocols used by the applications on the node, average packet size and average packet rates. 
The DAP component analyses all the traffic dropped by the HAD and makes dynamic decisions to deal 
with the attacks on the mobile nodes. For example, it is used for dynamic prevention of attacks at the 
upstream co-operating nodes.  It maintains the details of upstream co-operating nodes, stores the keys that 
are used for established IPSec secure tunnels, determines the attack traffic originating from all channels (1 
to N-1 secure channels and 1 in secure channel N), and determines thresholds and attack patterns that 
have to be prevented at the upstream co-operating node (secure tunnel). 
5. Implementation 
In this section, we present the implementation of our model. We have implemented our model as 
shown in Figure 4 using Cisco 2800 and 2500 series routers with IOS version 12.3. The management 
node is used for configuring the routers, maintaining the logs using syslog server and for enforcing access 
control policies on the traffic destined to the victim mobile node. The victim mobile node is a Samsung 
Galaxy S2 mobile device which is used to access the services in the Internet either via a mobile network 
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or a WLAN. Since we do not have the resources to test the model for mobile networks, we have used the 
setup as shown in Figure 4 for our experimentation. However this setup is similar to the case in Figure 3 
where all the data traffic from the victim mobile node passes through the SEC/M1G. In Figure 4, all the 
victims’ traffic passes through Cisco 2800-1 router.  
In this setup the mobile is considered 
to be accessing different services from 
the web servers.  The attacking sources 
can be flooding the victim node with 
ICMP and UDP floods with correct and 
spoofed source address. In default 
mode, such floods are prevented at the 
Cisco 2800-1 router. The access control 
is configured at Cisco 2800-1 router to 
permit only web traffic to the victim 
node. During this stage, any ICMP or 
UDP flood traffic that is destined to the 
victim mobile node is filtered at the 
Cisco 2800-1 router. However in this case, we cannot differentiate between the attack traffic originating 
from different attacking domains since the source address is spoofed. Figure 5 shows the attack traffic 
that is dropped at the routers. The attack starts during time interval 1 sec. The attacking sources AS1 and 
AS2 in Figure 4 send ICMP and UDP flood about 30 packets/sec using with correct and spoofed source 
address. The attack traffic is initially dropped at the router 2800-1 router until the threshold reaches 
50packets/sec. The packet drops are reported to syslog server on the management node.  
After the attack reaches threshold of 50 packets/sec, IPsec ESP tunnel is established between the cisco 
2800-1 and cisco2880-2 routers. Notice that the attack traffic is still dropped at the Cisco 2800-1 router 
until the tunnel is established between the routers. After the tunnel is established, we can easily determine 
attack traffic originating from the tunnel. Now access control is dynamically applied at the Cisco 2800-2 
router to prevent the attack traffic and tunnel only the web traffic. Hence at about 4 seconds, we can see 
that the attack packets are dropped at the upstream co-operating node (source of the tunnel). Notice that 
the attack traffic originating from Cisco 2500 series router (Non co-operating node) is still dropped at the 
Cisco 2800-1 router.  
6. Conclusion 
We have proposed techniques for securing healthcare related information communication between 
mobile devices and health service providers on the Internet. In particular, we have discussed a model and 
implementation that is able to counteract denial of service attacks on mobile nodes. Our model makes use 
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of IPSec protocol for achieving secure traceback of the upstream nodes through which the attack traffic is 
passing as well as for preventing the attack at the upstream nodes. We have shown that our model can be 
implemented in practice using existing devices and discussed performance characteristics of our 
implementation. 
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